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This paper investigates the existence of absolute optimal solutions for a partition P in
continuous and quasiconcave games. We show that the P-consistence property introduced in
the paper, together with the quasiconcavity and continuity of payoffs, permits the existence
of P-absolute optimal solutions in games with compact and convex strategy spaces. The P-
consistency property is a general condition that cannot be dispensed with for the existence of
P-absolute optimal solutions. We also characterize the existence of P-absolute optimal so-
lutions by providing necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. Moreover, we suggest an algorithm
for efﬁciently computing P-absolute optimal solutions.
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In 1959, Aumann [1959] introduced the strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) which ensures a more
restrictive stability than the Nash equilibrium one (Nash [1951]). A SNE is a Nash equilibrium
such that there is a nonempty set of players who could all gain by deviating together to some other
combination of strategies that is jointly feasible for them, when the other players who are not in
this set are expected to stay with their equilibrium strategies (see also Bernheim et al. [1987]).
Since this requirement applies to the grand coalition of all players, SNE must be Pareto efﬁcient.
So, a SNE is not only immune to unilateral deviations, but also to deviations by coalitions.
We know that the class of games for which a SNE exists is not large and the existence condi-
tions are very restrictive (Ichiishi [1981]). In order to avoid these problems, we consider a hybrid
gameinthesenseofZhao[1992]. Thisgameisplayedintwostages. First, playersformcoalitions,
then these coalitions, as super-players play non-cooperatively against each other.
Zhao [1991, 1992] introduced an intermediate solution concept which is between the coop-
erative and noncooperative solutions of a multiple objectives game. The cooperation in the ﬁrst
part consists of the deﬁnition of a partition. The second stage, an equilibrium solution is deﬁned
relative to this partition (see deﬁnitions 2.7, 2.8). The same author gives a sufﬁcient condition for
the existence of a multiple objectives game to have hybrid and quasi-hybrid solutions for any par-
tition. In this framework, ﬁrstly ~ x is a hybrid solution if for a given coalition K, no sub-coalition
q of K has any interest to deviate from this equilibrium (Deﬁnition of core), because this devia-
tion is penalized if the remaining of coalition K chooses his strategy ~ x q in the same equilibrium.
Secondly, ~ x is a quasi-hybrid solution if for each given coalition K, ~ xK is properly Pareto efﬁcient
for the multiple objectives sub-game relatively to K. Zhao [1999-a, 1999-b] deﬁnes -hybrid and
-hybrid solutions, respectively, and gives the sufﬁcient conditions for their existence.
This paper investigates the existence of absolute optimal solutions for an n-person game and
weighted absolute optimal solution for a multiple objectives game. In particular, ~ x is an absolute
optimal solution relative to a partition P if no player in any coalition S in P, can be better off
when the players deviate from their P-absolute optimal strategy proﬁle ~ xS. This means that at P-
absolute optimal solution, the players in coalition S 2 P play a strategy proﬁle that maximizes the
payoff of their players. This equilibrium is stable against deviation of any player from S 2 P. A
strategyproﬁle ~ xisaweighted absoluteoptimalsolutionrelative toapartitionP ifnoplayer inany
coalitionS inP, canbebetteroffwhentheplayersdeviatefromtheirP-weightedabsoluteoptimal
strategyproﬁle ~ xS. ThismeansthatatP-weightedabsoluteoptimal, theplayersincoalitionS play
a strategy proﬁle that maximizes the weighted payoff of their players. Notice that any P-absolute
optimal solution is both a hybrid and a quasi-hybrid solution. In this paper we ﬁll this gap by
proposing some existence results on absolute optimal and weighted absolute optimal solutions
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We show that the P-consistence property and P-weighted consistence property introduced in the
paper, together with the quasiconcavity and continuity of payoffs, permit the existence of P-
absolute optimal, and P-weighted absolute optimal solutions in games with compact and convex
strategy spaces. The consistence property is a general condition that cannot be dispensed with for
the existence of P-absolute optimal, and P-weighted absolute optimal solutions, which requires
that for each x 2 X, there exists z 2 X such that for each coalition S 2 P, zS is an element of
the best-reply correspondence formed by the coalition S. The P-consistence property is relatively
easy to check, say, by using the same methods as for ﬁnding the maximum of a utilitarian social
welfare function for every component zh;S of z
j1
S that is equal to zh;S of z
j2
S obtained for each
j1;j2 2 S. We also characterize the existence of absolute optimal solution relative to a partition
of players P by providing necessary and sufﬁcient conditions. Moreover, we suggest an algorithm
that can be used to efﬁciently compute an absolute optimal solution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the notions, deﬁnitions,
and some properties. Section 3 establishes sufﬁcient conditions for the existence of an absolute
optimal solution and provides a method for its computation. Section 4 concludes.
2 ABSOLUTE OPTIMAL SOLUTION AND ITS PROPERTIES
Consider the following n-person game in normal form deﬁned as
G = hI; Xi; uii (2.1)
where I = f1;:::;ng is the set of players, X =
Q
i2I
Xi is the set of strategies of the game, where Xi
(a nonempty set is in Rl(i)) is the set of strategies of player i, and ui is i’s payoff function X ! R.
Let = denote the set of all coalitions (i.e., nonempty subsets of I). For each coalition S 2 =,
denote by  S = fi 2 I : i = 2 Sg the complement of coalition S. If S is reduced to a singleton




set of strategies of players in coalition S. If fKjgj2f1;:::;sg is a partition of I, any strategy proﬁle
x = (x1;:::;xn) 2 X then can be written as x = (xK1;xK2;::;xKs) with xKi 2 XKi.
We say that a game G (2.1) is compact, convex, and continuous, respectively if, for all i 2 I,
Xi is compact and convex, and ui is and continuous on X, respectively.
For any two vectors a;b 2 Rn, a  b if and only if ai  bi for all i = 1;:::;n, a  b if and
only if a  b and a 6= b; and ﬁnally a  b if and only if ai > bi for all i = 1;:::;n.
A general multiple objectives mathematical programming problem is deﬁned as:
Vector Maximization (VM) : max
z2Z
F(x) = ff1(x);:::;fm(x)g; m > 1; (2.2)
3
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i = 1:::::m, are the objective functions to be maximized.
DEFINITION 2.1 A strategy proﬁle x 2 Z is said to be weakly Pareto efﬁcient (WPE) for VM
(2.2) if there does not exist y 2 Z such that F(y)  F(x).
DEFINITION 2.2 A strategy proﬁle x 2 Z is said to be Pareto efﬁcient (PE) for VM (2.2) if there
does not exist y 2 Z such that F(y)  F(x).
DEFINITION 2.3 A strategy proﬁle x 2 Z is said to be properly Pareto efﬁcient (PPE) for VM
(2.2) if x 2 R
e and if there is L > 0 such that for any i and x 2 Z satisfying fi(x) > fi(x), there
is a j 6= i so as fj(x) < fj(x) and
fi(x) fi(x)
fj(x) fj(x)  L.
Now, let us consider the following notation. Let S be any nonempty coalition in =, denote by
#S the number of elements in S. Let xS = (xi : i 2 S) and x S = (xi : i = 2 S) be the strategy
of coalition S and  S, respectively.
uS(:) = (ui(:) : i 2 S) 2 R#S be the vector payoff of coalition S. Zhao [1992] deﬁnes the
following worst vector payoffs to coalition S as follows:
uS(xS) = (ui
S(xS) : i 2 S)
and by
ui
S(xS) = f inf
y S2X S
ui
j(xS;y S)= j = 1;:::;m(i)g 2 R:
The cooperative and non-cooperative solutions are then deﬁned as:
DEFINITION 2.4 A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is said to be Nash equilibrium (NE) of game G (2.1),




That is, x is a Nash equilibrium if each player i chooses a xi as a best response to all others’
strategies x i.
DEFINITION 2.5 A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is said to be properly strong Nash equilibrium (SNE)
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tion, i.e., all players collectively) can proﬁtably deviate from the prescribed proﬁle. This deﬁnition
immediately implies that any properly strong equilibrium is both properly Pareto efﬁcient and a
Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is stable with regard to the deviation of any coalition.
REMARK 2.1 If we replace the properly Pareto efﬁciency by Pareto efﬁciency (or weakly Pareto
efﬁcient) in Deﬁnition 2.5, then x is said to be a super strong Nash equilibrium (strong Nash
equilibrium).
DEFINITION 2.6 A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is a core solution of game G (2.1), if for each S 2 =,
we have

S(x) = fxS 2 XS : uS(xS)  u(x)Sg = ;;
where u(x)S = (ui(x) : i 2 S).
x is a core solution if no coalition S can, by choosing another strategy available to S, guarantee
a higher payoff for each of its members independently of the actions of the outside players.
Zhao introduced the following concepts.
DEFINITION 2.7 (Zhao [1999-a]) Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A feasible strategy
proﬁle x 2 X is said to be an -hybrid solution1 (-HS) for the game G (2.1) if for each coalition





uS(xS;x S) = [ui(xS;x S); i 2 S]

:
DEFINITION 2.8 (Zhao [1999-b]) Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A feasible strategy
proﬁle x 2 X is said to be an -hybrid solution3 (-HS) for the game G (2.1) if for each coalition





uS(xS;x S) = [ui(xS;x S); i 2 S]

:
1The Weakly -Core: A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is in the weakly -core of a game G = hI;Xi;uii, if for each
S 2 = and for each xS 2 XS, there exists a y S 2 X S such that ui(xS;y S)  ui(x) for at least some i 2 S.
2(1) Let a noncooperative game G = hI;Xi;uii, then the -cooperative game corresponding to G is deﬁned as






uj(xS;y S). (2) x is in the -core set of G if x is in
the core set of G.
3The Weakly -Core: A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is in the weakly -core of a game G = hI;Xi;uii, if for each
S 2 =, there exists a y S 2 X S such that for each xS 2 XS, ui(xS;y S)  ui(x) for at least some i 2 S.
4(1) Let a noncooperative game G = hI;Xi;uii, then the -cooperative game corresponding to G is deﬁned as






uj(xS;y S). (2) x is in the -core set of G if x is in
the core set of G.
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troduce the deﬁnition of the concept of absolute optimal solution, which is also associated to a
partition of players.
DEFINITION 2.9 Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A feasible strategy x 2 X is said to be a
P-absolute optimal solution (AO) for the game G (2.1) if for each coalition S 2 P, we have
uS(x)  uS(yS;x S); 8yS 2 XS:
Or precisely xS 2
T
j2S
Argmaxfuj(yS;x S); yS 2 XSg for all S 2 P.
It is easy to see that when M = I, P = ffig; i 2 Ig is a partition of I, then a P-absolute
optimal solution is a Nash equilibrium. A strategy proﬁle x is a P-absolute optimal solution if no
player in any coalition S in P, can be better off when the players deviate from their P-absolute
optimalstrategyproﬁlexS. ThismeansthatatP-absoluteoptimalsolution, theplayersincoalition
S 2 P play a strategy proﬁle that maximizes the payoff of their players. This equilibrium is stable
against deviation of any player of S 2 P.
REMARK 2.2 The P-absolute optimal solution is stable. Indeed, if the complement coalition of
S chooses his (her) strategy x S in a P-absolute optimal solution, then it constrains all players
of S to choose their strategies in the same P-absolute optimal solution; if any player j of set S
deviates from his strategy xj, then this player cannot improve his payoff.
REMARK 2.3 Any P-absolute optimal solution is also a Nash equilibrium. In that sense, the
P-absolute optimal solution can be considered as a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium. In case of
multiplicity of P-absolute optimal solutions, if a coalition chooses publicly a strategy which per-
tains to a certain P-absolute optimal solution, other players will follow and that given P-absolute
optimal solution will be selected. In contrast, when there is no P-absolute optimal solution in
the game but multiplicity of Nash equilibria, coalitions need to coordinate in order to select joint
strategies leading to a chosen Nash equilibrium.
We can also deﬁne a strong Nash equilibrium relatively to partition P as follows.
DEFINITION 2.10 Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is said to
be P-properly strong Nash equilibrium 5 (PSNE) of game G (2.1), if for all S 2 P, and for






uK(xK;x K) = [ui(xK;x K); i 2 K]

:
5We can also deﬁne the P-super-strong Nash equilibrium, P-strong Nash equilibrium by replacing the “properly
Pareto efﬁcient” by “Pareto efﬁcient”, and “weakly Pareto efﬁcient” in Deﬁnition 2.10, respectively.
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A strategy proﬁle x is a P-properly strong Nash equilibrium if no sub-coalition K in S (for
each S 2 P) can proﬁtably deviate from the prescribed proﬁle xK.











REMARK 2.4 The P-absolute optimal solution or P-strong Nash equilibrium does not imply nor
is implied by coalition-proof Nash equilibrium in Bernheim et al. [1987] or negotiation-proof
Nash equilibrium in Xue [2000].
Let us consider the following example.
EXAMPLE 2.1 Consider the three-player game with the following payoff function deﬁned from
[0;1]  [0;1]  [0;1], x = (x1;x2;x3).
u1(x) = x1 + x2x3,
u2(x) = x1 + x2   x3,
u3(x) = x1   4x2 + 3x3.
The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is x = (1;1;1). This game has not a strong Nash
equilibrium. Indeed, let ~ x be any strategy in X. We distinguish two cases: If ~ x = (1;1;1), then
there exists a coalition S = f2;3g and y2 = 0:5, y3 = 0:4 such that
u2(~ x1;y2;y3) = 1:1  1 = u2(~ x);
u3(~ x1;y2;y3) = 0:2 > 0 = u3(~ x)
If ~ x 6= (1;1;1). Thus there exists ~ xi 6= 1, i = 1;2;3. Then, there exists S = fig and a strategy
yi = 1 such that
ui(yi; ~ x i) > ui(~ x).
The game considered in this example has a P-absolute solution and P-strong Nash equilib-
rium, if P = ff1;2g;f3gg or S = ff1;3g;f2gg. Indeed, let for example P = ff1;2g;f3gg.
• S1 = f1;2g, arg max
y1;y22[0;1]
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This example illustrate the situation where strong Nash equilibrium does not exists but P-absolute
solution and P-strong Nash equilibrium exist (P = ff1;2g;f3gg or P = ff1;3g;f2gg), i.e., the
players 1 and 2 or player 1 and 3 can cooperate but players 2 and 3 cannot.
In the case where P = fP1;P2g is a partition of I, then the following lemma shows that in
a zero-sum game, the P-absolute solution possesses the average property for any coalition, i.e.
the average of payoff functions of players in any coalition has the same value for all P-absolute
optimal solutions.
LEMMA 2.1 Let P = fP1;P2g be a partition of I and the game G (2.1) be a zero-sum. If x and







PROOF. Let x and e x are two different S-equilibrium for the game G (2.1). Then for any i = 1;2,
we have
(
uj(x Pi;yPi)  uj(x); 8j 2 Pi; 8yPi 2 XPi
uj(e x Pi; e yPi)  uj(e x); 8j 2 Pi; 8e yPi 2 XPi:
(2.3)









uj(x); 8yPi 2 XPi
P
j2 Pi
uj(e x Pi; e yPi) 
P
j2 Pi
uj(e x); 8e yPi 2 XPi:
(2.4)
We have P = fP1;P2g, then there exists Pk such that Pk =  Pi = P i, taking into account from
system (2.3), we obtain
(
uj(xPi;y Pi)  uj(x); 8j 2  Pi; 8y Pi 2 X Pi










uj(x); 8y Pi 2 X Pi
P
j2 Pi
uj(e xPi; e y Pi) 
P
j2 Pi
uj(e x); 8e y Pi 2 X Pi:
(2.5)





























uj(e x) and since i is any arbitrary element in
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This section ﬁrst introduces the concept of P-consistence property, which is a key element in our
ﬁrst main result. The second result characterize the existence of a P-absolute optimal solution in
compact and convex games.
DEFINITION 3.1 (P-CONSISTENCE PROPERTY) Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A game





Argmaxfuj(x S;yS); yS 2 XSg; 8S 2 P:
REMARK 3.1 The P-consistence property is relatively easy to check. Indeed, the deﬁnition of
the P-consistence property implies that zS is the maximum for the payoff function of each player
in S 2 P. Then, to check if the P-consistence property is satisﬁed is reduced to checking if
every component zh;S of z
j1
S that is equal to zh;S of z
j2
S obtained for each j1;j2 2 S. If so, z is a
P-consistent coalition, i.e., z 2 X and zS 2
T
i2S
Argmaxfui(x S;yS); yS 2 XSg, which means
the P-consistence property is satisﬁed.
DEFINITION 3.2 (P-QUASICONCAVE) Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A game G (2.1)
is said to be P-quasiconcave if Xi is convex i 2 I and for each S 2 P, the function yS !
uj(yS;x S) is quasiconcave on XS, for each j 2 S, and x S 2 X S.
We then establish the following existence theorem on P-absolute solutions.
THEOREM 3.1 Suppose the P = fPigi2M is a partition of I and game G (2.1) is compact,
continuous, P-quasiconcave, and satisﬁes the P-consistence property. Then, it possesses a P-
absolute solution.
PROOF. Consider the following correspondence C deﬁned from X in X by
CP(x) = fz 2 X : zS 2
\
j2S
Argmaxfuj(x S;yS); yS 2 XSg; 8S 2 Pg:
The P-consistency property, compactness, continuity and P-quasiconcavity of G imply that for
all x 2 X, CP(x) is nonempty, closed convex valued and CP is upper hemicontinuous over X.




Argmaxfuj(x S;yS); yS 2 XSg, for all S 2 P, which means x is P-absolute optimal
solution.
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EXAMPLE 3.1 Consider a game with n = 3, I = f1;2;3g, X1 = X2 = [ 1;1] and
u1(x) = x1 + x2x3,
u2(x) = x1 + x2   x3,
u3(x) = x1   x2 + x3.
It can be easily seen that the game is compact, continuous and quasiconcave. Let us consider
the following partition P = ff1;2g;f3gg of f1;2;3g. Then, the game considered possesses
a P-absolute optimal solution that is (1;1;1). However, it does not satisfy the P-consistence
property. Indeed, let x 2 X such that x3 < 0. Then, we obtain Argmaxfu1(y1;y2;x3); y1;2 2
X1;2g = f(1; 1)g and Argmaxfu2(y1;y2;x3); y1;2 2 X1;2g = f(1;1)g. Thus, z1
2;f1;2g =
 1 6= 1 = z2




Argmaxfuj(y1;2;x3); y1;2 2 X1;2g.
In order to characterize the existence of P-absolute optimal solutions of the game G (2.1), we
will use the following lemma due to Tian [1993].
Let us in ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of transfer continuity and transfer FS-convexity concepts
introduced by Tian [1993].6
DEFINITION 3.3 (TRANSFER CLOSED) Let X and Y be two topological spaces. A correspon-
dence G : X ! 2Y is said to be transfer closed-valued on X if for every x 2 X, y = 2 G(x) implies
that there exists x
0
2 X such that y = 2 cl G(x
0
).
DEFINITION 3.4 (TRANSFER FS-CONVEXITY) Let X be a topological space and let Y be a
nonempty convex subset of a vector space F. A correspondence G : X ! 2Y is said to be transfer
FS-convex on X if for any ﬁnite subset Xm = fx1;:::;xmg 2 hXi, there exists a corresponding
ﬁnite subset Y m = fy1;:::;ymg 2 hY i such that for any subset fyk1
;yk2
;:::;yks
g  Y m, 1 








Tian [1993] has established the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.1 Let X be a topological space and Y be a nonempty compact convex subset in a
Hausdorf topological vector space F. Suppose a correspondence G : X ! 2Y is transfer closed-
valued and transfer FS-convex on X. Then,
T
x2X
G(x) is nonempty and compact.
6Tian [1993] characterizes the existence of greatest and maximal elements of weak and strict preferences. Condi-
tions called transfer FS-convexity and transfer SS-convexity are shown to be necessary and, in addition with transfer
closedness and transfer openness, sufﬁcient for the existence of greatest and maximal elements of weak and strict
preferences, respectively.
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g : X ! b X deﬁned as x 7! g(x) = (xS;:::;xS | {z }
#S times
; S 2 P);









S = XS, 8j.
REMARK 3.3 We have
8x 2 X; sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y)  	P(x;g(x));
because if we put b y = g(x), and we obtain 	P(x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)).
The following lemma gives the relation between P-absolute optimal solution of the game G
(2.1) and the function 	P.
LEMMA 3.2 The following two propositions are equivalent.
1. x 2 X is a P-absolute optimal solution of game (2.1).
2. sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)).
PROOF. Necessity ()): Let x 2 X be a P-absolute optimal solution of game G (2.1). Then
uj(x S;tS)  uj(x), 8S 2 P, 8tS 2 XS and 8j 2 S, hence 	P(x; b y)  	P(x;g(x)), 8b y 2 b X
i.e. sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y)  	P(x;g(x)). Taking into account of Remark 3.3, we obtain
sup
b y2 b X
	P (x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)).
Sufﬁciency ((): Let x 2 X such that sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)), this equality implies














fuj(x K; b yK) uj(x)g  0:
For b y 2 b X such that b yS = (b yi
S; xS;:::;xS | {z }
(#S 1)time
) with b yi
S is arbitrarily chosen in XS and b yK =
(xK;:::;xK), 8K 6= S; we obtain then
X
j2S=fig





fuj(x K; b yK)   uj(x)g = 0
11
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arbitrarily chosen in P;S, respectively. Thus we have,
8b yS 2 XS; ui(x S; b yS)  ui(x);
for each S 2 P and i 2 S, therefore x is a P-absolute optimal solution of the game G (2.1). This
completes the proof.
Lemma 3.2 transforms the problem of determination of P-absolute optimal solutions of the
game G (2.1) into a problem of determination of issues x 2 X verifying
sup
b y2 b X
f	P(x; b y)   	P(x;g(x))g = 0.
Let us consider the following deﬁnitions.
DEFINITION 3.5 Let Z be a nonempty subset of a topological space, Y be a nonempty set and
let g : Z ! Y be a function. A function f : Z  Y ! R is said to be g-diagonally transfer
lower continuous in x if for every (x;y) 2 Z  Y , f(x;y) > f(x;g(x)) implies that there exist
some point y
0
2 Y and some neighborhood V(x)  Z of x such that f(z;y
0
) > f(z;g(z)) for all
z 2 V(x).
g-Diagonally transfer lower continuity in x says that if a point x in X is upset by a deviation point
y in Y comparing to f(x;g(x)), then there is an open set of points containing x, all of which can
be upset by a single deviation point y
0
. Here, transfer lower continuity in x refers to the fact that y
may be transferred to some y
0
in order for the inequality to hold for all points in a neighborhood of
x and g-diagonal refers to the point (x;g(x)). It is clear that if the function f(x;y)   f(x;g(x))
is lower semi-continuous in x, then it is also g-diagonally transfer lower continuous in x, but the
converse is not true.
DEFINITION 3.6 Let Z be a nonempty convex subset of a vector space E, let Y be a nonempty
set and let g : Z ! Y be a function. A function f : Z  Y ! R is said to be g-diagonally
transfer quasiconcave in y on Y if, for any ﬁnite subset fy1;:::;ymg  Y , there exists a cor-
responding ﬁnite subset fx1;:::;xmg  Z such that for any subset J  f1;2;:::;mg, and any
x 2 cofxh; h 2 Jg we have min
h2J
f(x;yh)  f(x;g(x)).
g-Diagonally transfer quasiconcavity roughly says that given any ﬁnite subset Y m = fy1;:::;ymg
of deviation proﬁles, there exists a corresponding ﬁnite subset Xm = fx1;:::;xmg of candidate
proﬁles such that for any subset fxk1
;xk2
;:::;xks
g  Xm, 1  s  m, so that its convex
combinations are not upset by those deviation proﬁles in X ~ m.
The following theorem characterizes the existence of absolute optimal solution in a compact
and convex game.
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Q
i2I
Xi be a nonempty compact, convex subset of a Hausdorff locally
convex vector space Rl(i). Assume that 	P(x; b y) is a g-diagonally transfer lower continuous in
x. Then, the game G (2.1) has at least one P-absolute optimal solution if and only if the function
	P(x; b y) is g-diagonally transfer quasiconcave in b y.
PROOF. Necessity ()): Let x 2 X be the P-absolute optimal solution of game G (2.1). Then,
Lemma 3.2 implies that
sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)):
Let B = fb y1;:::; b ymg  b X. Then, there exists a corresponding ﬁnite subset A = fx1;:::;xmg 




	P(x; b yh)  sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)):
Sufﬁciency ((): Let us consider the following collection
G(b y) = fx 2 X; 	P(x; b y)  	P(x;g(x))g; b y 2 b X:
We have the g-diagonally transfer lower semicontinuous in x and g-diagonally transfer quasicon-
cave in b y of 	P(x; b y) implies that the collection G(b y) is transfer closed-valued and FS-convex
on X. Then, from Lemma 3.3, we conclude
T
b y2 b X
G(b y) is nonempty, i.e. there exists x 2 X such
that x 2 G(b y), for all b y 2 b X. Hence, sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)). From Lemma 3.2, x is a
P-absolute optimal solution of the game G (2.1). This completes the proof.
If the partition fPigi2I is reduced to the following figi2I, then Theorem 3.2 is identical to the
Theorem 1 of Baye et al. [1993].
Taking into account Remark 3.3 and Lemma 3.2, we obtain the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3.1 The game G (2.1) has at least one P-absolute optimal solution if and only if




b y2 b X
f	P(x; b y)   	P(x;g(x))g: (3.1)
From this Proposition we obtain the following method for the determination of P-absolute
optimal solutions of game G (2.1).
We deduce the following corollary of g-maximum inequality.
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Require: Calculate the value  = inf
x2X
sup
b y2 b X
f	P(x; b y)   	P(x;g(x))g of (3.1).
if  > 0, then
the game G (2.1) has no P-absolute optimal solution.
else
any strategy proﬁle x 2 X such that sup
b y2 b X
	P(x; b y) = 	P(x;g(x)) are P-absolute optimal
solutions of the game G (2.1).
end if
COROLLARY 3.1 Let X be a nonempty compact, convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex
vector space E, let Y be a nonempty set and g : X ! Y be a function. Let  be a real-valued
function on X  Y such that (x;y) is a g-diagonally transfer lower semicontinuous in x. Then,
the function (x;y) is g-diagonally transfer quasiconcave in y if and only if there exists x 2 X,
such that
(x;y)  (x;g(x)); 8y 2 Y:
3.1 EXTENSION TO MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES
Consider the following n-person multiple objectives game in normal form deﬁned as
MOG = hI; Xi; uii (3.2)
where I = f1;:::;ng is the set of players, X =
Q
i2I
Xi is the set of strategies of the game, where
Xi (a nonempty set is in Rl(i)) is the set of strategies of player i and ui is i’s payoff function
X ! Rm(i).
In MOG (3.2), each player has a vector payoff to optimize, so if m(i) = 1 for each player, then
the MOG (3.2) becomes exactly an n-person game G deﬁned in (2.1). In the case, where n = 1
and m(1) > 1, MOG (3.2) becomes the standard multiple objectives mathematical programming
(MOMP)7 problem.
For each player i in I, let
i = fi = (i
1;:::;i
m(i)) 2 Rm(i) : i





be the unit simplex of Rm(i).
7For more details about the MOMP problem, see Zhao [1983]
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function of player i:





j(x) with i 2 i:
Zhao [1983] deﬁnes the concepts of hybrid solution and quasi-hybrid solution for MOG (3.2),
and he shows that under primitive conditions, MOG (3.2) possesses hybrid and quasi-hybrid solu-
tions.
DEFINITION 3.8 Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A feasible strategy x 2 X is said to be
an hybrid solution (HS) for the game MOG (3.2) if for each coalition S 2 P, xS is a core solution
MOGS(x S), where
MOGS(x S) = hS;Xi;ui(xS;x S)i:
DEFINITION 3.9 Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A feasible strategy x 2 X is said to be an
quasi-hybrid solution (QHS) for the game MOG (3.2) if for each coalition S 2 P, xS is a properly











We introduce the following deﬁnition of weighted absolute optimal solution.
DEFINITION 3.10 Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A feasible strategy x 2 X is said to
be a P-weighted absolute optimal solution (WAO) relative to  2  =
Q
i2I
i for the game MOG
(3.2) if for each coalition S 2 P, we have
WUS;S(x)  WUS;S(yS;x S); 8yS 2 XS;




ArgmaxfWUj;j(yS;x S); yS 2 XSg for all S 2 P:
A strategy proﬁle x is a P-weighted absolute optimal solution if no player in any coalition S
in P, can be better off when the players deviate from their P-weighted absolute optimal strategy
proﬁle xS. This means that at a P-weighted absolute optimal, the players in coalition S play a
strategy proﬁle that maximizes the weighted payoffs.
PROPRETY 3.1 Any P-absolute optimal solution is also a P-weighted absolute optimal solution.
And if for each i 2 I, m(i) = 1, then the two solutions are identical.
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DEFINITION 3.11 A strategy proﬁle x 2 X is said to be P-weighted properly strong Nash equi-
librium8 (PWSNE) relative to  2  of game MOG (3.2), if for each S 2 P and K 2 =S,





WUK;K(xK;x K) = [WUi;i(xK;x K); i 2 K]

:
PROPRETY 3.2 Any P-weighted absolute optimal solution is also a P-weighted properly strong
Nash equilibrium.
DEFINITION 3.12 (P-WEIGHTED CONSISTENCE PROPERTY) Let P = fPigi2M be a partition
of I. A game MOG (3.2) is said to satisfy the P-weighted consistence property relative to  2 




ArgmaxfWUj;j(x S;yS); yS 2 XSg; 8S 2 P:
DEFINITION 3.13 (P-WEIGHTED QUASICONCAVE) Let P = fPigi2M be a partition of I. A
game MOG (3.2) is said to be P-weighted quasiconcave relative to  2  if Xi is convex, i 2 I
and for each S 2 P, the function yS ! WUi;i(yPi;x Pi) is quasiconcave on XS, for each i 2 S,
and x S 2 X S.
We then establish the following existence theorem on P-weighted absolute solutions.
THEOREM 3.3 Suppose the P = fPigi2M is a partition of I and game MOG (3.2) is compact,
continuous, P-weighted quasiconcave, and satisﬁes the P-weighted consistence property relative
to  2 . Then, it possesses a P-weighted absolute solution relative to .
PROOF. The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 3.1.
In the same manner, we can characterize the existence of a P-weighted absolute optimal solu-
tion in compact and convex games. Let us consider the following functions.










g : X ! b X deﬁned as x 7! g(x) = (xS;:::;xS | {z }
#S times
; S 2 P);









S = XS, 8j.
We have the following theorem.
8We can also deﬁne the P-weighted super-strong Nash equilibrium, P-weighted strong Nash equilibrium by replac-
ing the “properly Pareto efﬁcient” by “Pareto efﬁcient”, and “weakly Pareto efﬁcient” in Deﬁnition 3.11, respectively.
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Q
i2I
Xi be a nonempty compact, convex subset of a Hausdorff locally
convex vector space Rl(i). Assume that 	;P(x; b y) is a g-diagonally transfer lower continuous in
x. Then, the game MOG (3.2) has at least one P-weighted absolute optimal solution relative to 
if and only if the function 	;P(x; b y) is g-diagonally transfer quasiconcave in b y.
PROOF. The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 3.2.
4 CONCLUSION
There is no general theorem on the existence of absolute optimal solutions in the literature. In this
paper, we ﬁll this gap by proposing some existence results on absolute optimal solutions relative
to a partition of players P in general n-person and multiple objectives games. We provide a con-
dition (called P-consistency property) which together with the P-quasiconcavity and continuity
of payoffs permits the existence of P-absolute optimal solution in n-person games with compact
and convex strategy spaces. The P-consistency property is a general condition that cannot be dis-
pensed with for the existence of an absolute optimal solution. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to
check. We also characterize the existence of a P-absolute optimal solution by providing a nec-
essary and sufﬁcient condition. Moreover, we suggest a procedure that can be used to efﬁciently
compute P-absolute optimal solutions.
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